Post by xyz3000 on Feb 12, 2024 4:58:41 GMT
There are many questions about what is real in the actions of competition defense bodies in relation to the fight against cartels. I begin by explaining that I mention Cade here because it is the best-known body in the system, which is made up of the Secretariat of Economic Law (SDE), the Ministry of Justice, the Secretariat of Economic Monitoring (Seae), the Ministry of Finance and the Council Administrative Office for Economic Defense (Cade), an independent agency with administrative links to the Ministry of Justice. In fact, the generic mention of Cade must be understood as the mention of the entire system. It is known that cartels are agreements between competing companies to the detriment of buyers of certain products.
Cartels may have as their objectives price fixing (competitors agree not to sell at prices lower than agreed), market allocation (competitors agree that each purchaser is allocated to a specific supplier, eliminating the benefits of free competition), bid fraud (competitors decide Estonia Email List who will win each bid, so as not to allow bidders to obtain the benefit of free competition) and others. Cartels thus constitute damage not only to the harmed purchasers but also and above all to the economy as a whole (not least because the defense of competition is a matter of public law, and it is already an axiom to say that this right protects competition and does not competitors), since capitalist logic finds one of its bases in the dispute between economic agents.
If the dispute is eliminated or falsified, the capitalist logic is reversed, with buyers at the mercy of sellers. We speak here of sellers as possible cartelizers, as this is the hypothesis best known in doctrine and jurisprudence, but the existence of a cartel of buyers is also possible, especially in markets and in situations where purchasing power is high. In matters of cartels – as in any case that constitutes an infringement of the economic order – the investigation is carried out by the SDE, which, in the end, must (i) archive the administrative process, appealing ex officio to Cade or (ii) send the process administrative decision to Cade with a recommendation for conviction. Cade is the body that has the power to decide on the existence or not of a cartel, applying the penalty it deems appropriate.
Cartels may have as their objectives price fixing (competitors agree not to sell at prices lower than agreed), market allocation (competitors agree that each purchaser is allocated to a specific supplier, eliminating the benefits of free competition), bid fraud (competitors decide Estonia Email List who will win each bid, so as not to allow bidders to obtain the benefit of free competition) and others. Cartels thus constitute damage not only to the harmed purchasers but also and above all to the economy as a whole (not least because the defense of competition is a matter of public law, and it is already an axiom to say that this right protects competition and does not competitors), since capitalist logic finds one of its bases in the dispute between economic agents.
If the dispute is eliminated or falsified, the capitalist logic is reversed, with buyers at the mercy of sellers. We speak here of sellers as possible cartelizers, as this is the hypothesis best known in doctrine and jurisprudence, but the existence of a cartel of buyers is also possible, especially in markets and in situations where purchasing power is high. In matters of cartels – as in any case that constitutes an infringement of the economic order – the investigation is carried out by the SDE, which, in the end, must (i) archive the administrative process, appealing ex officio to Cade or (ii) send the process administrative decision to Cade with a recommendation for conviction. Cade is the body that has the power to decide on the existence or not of a cartel, applying the penalty it deems appropriate.